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Chapter Six 
RELIGIOUS BROTHERHOODS IN CHECHNY A 
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Religious Brotherhoods in Chechnya 
Yavus Akhmadov, Stephen R. Bowers, and Marion T. Doss, Jr. 
Executive Summary 
S f· . n of the most important religious movements in Chechnya. It is u Ism IS 0 e I Id't's ot 
. .. ., 0 ular rallying point and, to the externa wor ,I I n 
slgn.lflcant be~aus~. It 1S
t 
a p p nber of these clandestine brotherhoods. Sufism gives .its 
obvIous who IS 01 IS no a mel . I . t ,·t 
. . t' I b sis that is somewhat like that of the ear y commUI1lS pm y. 
adherents an OIgal1lza IOna a. Cl ltd K nta Hadji 
Th ' tty-seven religious movements operating in lec my a ~ .ay. u , . 
. ere ,lrfe hwen t' tant of these and is associated with the Qadmya brotherhood, 
IS one 0 t e mos ImpOi . ' .. b' th I ods 
, .. 'e arded as the second most important of the Soviet-era IO eno ' .. 
generallp
y lllg· tl f' . t Chechen war much of Chechen society was mobilIzed by 
o owmg le tIS ' II . I b tl Val'habits 
'. The Kunta-Hadjists, whose values were declarec lerellca y .le ~ ~' 
Vakhdab\lsm. I . lpell'tl'on and sometime combat with this more milItant and antl-foun t lemse ves 111 con . 
Russianl~~l~~~1t1ta_Hadjists support the restoration of the Shari'a Isla~ic. laws a~d hav~ 
.. , d 'd t A Maskhadov for his ambiguous stand towmds the Issue 0 
cnttclze presl en . . 
Vakhabism. 
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The Chechens 
In the introduction to her study "Who Are the Chechen?", Johanna Nichols 
explains that the term "Chechen" is a Russian ethnonym, based on the name of a village, 
Chechen-aul, rather than the name used by these people to describe themselves. Rather 
than "Chechen", they call themselves either as "Nokhchi" or, more frequently in recent 
years, as "Vainah," a term best translated as "my nation, my people." Like their 
neighbors, the Ingush were also given their name by the Russians. They were named after 
the village of Angusht. The Ingush refer to themselves as the Ghalghay, They took this 
name from an association of three major families which shared the common surname 
Ghalghay. The Chechens are the largest North Caucasian group and the second largest 
Caucasian group after the Georgians. Although most Chechens are literate in Russian, at 
least 97% of them claim Chechen as their first language. 182 
The Chechen people have occupied their north Caucasian homeland for several 
millennia prior to the Russian conquest. Their society was characterized by no social or 
class distinctions and the only meaningful categories of rank were based on age, kinship 
and social honor. And although they had no formal governmental structures, they were 
nonetheless an independent nation with their own language and territory. 
Since the Russian conquest, the Chechens have suffered deportations, the 
suppression of linguistic and religious structures, and the attempt to destroy their culture 
through programs of Russification and Sovietization. The Russian-Chechen relationship 
has been characterized by periodic explosions of nationalism, violent military clashes, 
brutal suppression, and economic desolation. 
Major Russian-Chechen Wars 
Por over six millennia, Chechens have lived in and defended their North 
Caucasian homeland against the inroads of successive invaders, including Persians, 
Arabs, Mongols, Buddhists, Turks and Russians. Converted to Islam at about the same 
time as the Russian conquest (from the late 1500s to mid- I 800s), the Chechens have 
waged successive wars against the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the Russian 
Republic, first to avoid conquest and then to achieve independence. The following table 
illustrates the relentless nature of this ongoing, intermittent warfare. 
Synopsis of the Russian-Chechen conflicts 
Period Chechen Leader(s) Sufi Order Result 
Involved 
Late 1700s Sheik Mansur Ushurma Nagshband Russians defeated in 1785 
battle of Sunzha River 
1824·1859 Series of Imams, best Nagshband Short·lived Islamic slate 
known is Sheik Imam 
Shamil 
1864·1865, Various followers of Qadiri along Conlested Russian rule 
1877,1879, the Chechen Ghandi, with through WWI 
1890s Qadiri Sheik Kunta Nagshband 
1"' Johanna Nichols, "Who are the Chechen?", Linguist List, 
http://www.hurtfordhwp.com/archives/63/077.htm. pp. 1-2. Nichols, pp. 3-5. 
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Hadji Kishiev 
1917-1925 Sheik Uwn Hadji, et al Naqshband Uprising suppressed in Qadiri 1925 Sheik Ali Mitaev 
1929-1936 
Soviet purge of sun adepts 
continues until eve of 
WWII 
1940, 1943 Hassan lzrailov 
Entire nation deported to 
Siberia in 194, returned to 
Chechnya in 1957. New 
sun brotherhood Vis Hadji 
or Vakhab formed during 
exile 
1990 President Jhokhar Quasi-
Struggle for independence 
Dudaev Qadirist 1992-1994, mobilization 
1994-1996 President Jhokhar Quasi- War with Russia and de 
Dudaev Qadirist facto independence 
1999-2000 President AsIan ? 
Current war begun by 
Maskhadov Vakhab Islamic 
Shamil Basacv Vakhab conservatives also known 
as Chechcn Figbters 
What Is Sufism and Why Is It Important'? 
In their book Mvstics and Commissars: Std1sm in the Soviet Union, Alexandre 
Bennigsen and S. End;rs Wimbush argue that .Sufis~ is an in~portant aspect of Islam 
throughout the world and is becoming increasmgly lln~ortant ~n what ~as the USSR 
when they wrote their book. In that study, they provIde an I~troductlon to SufIsm, 
analyze the structure of Sufi brotherhoods, de~cnbe .the recrUItment . of. adepts, and 
examine the make-up of the brotherhoods and the mner.hfe of ~hose as~oclatlOns. 
More recent studies have indicated that the revIval of mterest m Chechen culture 
has been accompanied by a conversion to the Sunni branch of Islam. ~ost adh~re .to the 
Sufi form of Islam and join together in brotherhoods of 10 t~ 40 dl~clple.s (or dIscIples). 
They believe that practitioners of the faith ~an. achie.ve a mystIcal Ul110n wIth God through 
the zikr, a ceremony that consists of a recItatIon of prayers tha.t may be accompan~~d by 
vigorous dancing that will induce an ecstatic state. I~lam dId. not. replace tradItIOnal 
Chechen culture but became a part of it, thus preservmg the IdentIty of the Chechen 
nation. 183 
Sufism is significant because it is a popular rallying point an~, to the external 
world it is not obvious who is or is not a member of these c1andestme brotherhoods. 
Sufis~ gives its adherents an organizational basis that is somewhat like that .of th~ early 
communist party during its revolutionary stage of development. SufIsm IS the 
predominant form of Islam in Chechnya. . . . 
During the Soviet era, authorities worked to control the formal relIgiOUS structllles 
seen as necessary for the practice and persistence of Islam. Consequ~ntly, there was an 
"official Islam," supported by the state but maintained at a clearly madequate ~evel. of 
, .t Whl'le Soviet officials believed that this condition would lead to a detenoratlOn SUppOl . . ' "I I I I " 
of Islamic religious life, the real impact was the nurturIng ot a system of paral e s am 
18) Edward Kline, "Chechnya After the War," ASF New DOCllmellts, http://www.wdn.com/asf/cgi/ASF. 
October, 1998, accessed on May 1,2000. 
r 
w 
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totally beyond the reach of state control. This parallel system supported the de facto 
expansion of Islam during a time of anti-Islamic policy.184 
Kunta Hadji 
.. .There are twenty-seve~l religious movements operating in Chechnya today. Kunta 
HadJI IS one of the most nnportant of these and is associated with the Qadiriya 
brotherhood, generally regarded as the second most important of the Soviet-era 
brotherhoods. As Professor Yavus Z. Akhmadov explains, the Kunta Hadji movement is 
the most significant form of Sufism in Chechnya. 
Soviet and Czarist efforts to suppress this movement were intense. One 
consequence ?f th~ suppression of the Kunta Hadji movement is that no official portraits 
of Kunta HadJI eXIst. Professor Akhmadov recounts a meeting that he had in Elishan-Jurt, 
the village.it~ which Kunta H~~ji was born. The localmurid said that during his prayers, 
he had a VISIOn of Kunta HadJ!. Later, someone showed him a picture and, based on the 
vision from his prayers, he declared that it was the founder of this movement. Efforts to 
find an artistic conception of what Kunta Hadji looked like have been very difficult. It is 
apparent that no such photograph or portrait can be found anywhere in Chechnya or the 
surrounding region. Based on what initially appeared to be a promising lead, our contacts 
conducted a search in Uzbekistan but, to date, have failed to locate the Sufi saint's 
picture. 
The Kunta-Hadji Chechen Religious Movement 
In Chechnya's long history of national-liberation movements and wars, an 
important role was played by events connected with the name of the Sheik Kunta-Hadji. 
His name and the movement linked to it acquired special relevance in the 1990's, when a 
new attempt to politicize this religious brotherhood took place. For many people, Kunta-
Hadji became the "Chechen Gandhi." 
No fearsome Chechen warrior such as Mansur, Ghazi-Mohammed, ShamiI, or 
even the legendary brave men Baibullat Taimiev, Bdysangur Benoyevski, et cetera has 
been able to exercise such powerful influence on the spiritual life of the Chechen people 
as this modest peasant-worker, "miska" (man of God not of this world). The name of the 
Sheik is so holy that people considered it a "taboo." In Chechnya, people call him "The 
Sheik from Eliskhan-Yurt", "Son of Kisha", or simply "Hadji". He is considered to have 
reached a "hidden state of existence" and the details surrounding his death are not 
believed. 
Throughout its existence, the atheist Soviet regime conducted a fierce ideological 
war against the "Son of Kisha" and his followers. Despite great effort, the Soviets lost 
this war; the name of the Sheik is still being worshipped by the people of Chechnya, and 
the number of his followers has grown up to this day. Currently, the number of active 
murids l85 (adepts) in the Islamic brotherhood (Order) of the "Sheik from Eliskhan-Yurt", 
who actively practice the dictates of the Order amounts to some 20 to 25 thousand in 
Chechnya. However, the total number of those who accept the Order (i.e. recognize the 
IH4 Bennigsen and Wimhush, pp. 85-86. 
IRS Muridism the most militant movcment in Islam. Murids were obligcd to Follow blindly the orders of 
sheIkhs and imams. The extreme expression of muridism is the idea of "oazavat" - the war against 
"nonbelievers." 0 
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Sheik as their ustaz,186 although without performing active duties) numbers several 
hundred thousand followers. 
Consequently, the Order of the Son of Kisha is the largest, most influential, and, 
most importantly, the most dynamic, fastest growing organization in the contemporary 
Chechen Republic. This allows us to conclude that the phenomenon of the famous mid-
19th century Chechen Sheik has not yet been exhausted. 
The "Hadji movement," in both its political and religious contexts, essentially has 
not been studied. While writing this article, I used facts published by representatives of 
the Czarist administration-A. Ippolitov and G. A. Vertepov, and carefully reviewed 
works of authors of the Soviet and post-Soviet periods, such as H. D. Oshayev, A. A. 
Salamov, A. D. Yandarov, V. H. Akayev, and M. M. Moustafinov. It is important to note 
the role of the latter author, whose doctoral dissertation on the Order of Kunta-Hadji and 
its followers has been particularly helpful. The monographic work on Kunta-Hadji has 
been compiled by V.H. Akayev. 
From sources related to the above-mentioned movement, we could name 
documents found in various archives in Caucasian cities, particularly Grozny, 
Vladikavkaz, Tbilisi, Makhachkala, as well as publications of preachings of the "Son of 
Kisha" undertaken before the Soviet revolution in the Daghestani town of Temirkhak-
Shura. I have personally gathered a small field material-local stories, legends, including 
video and audio recordings. 
There are also materials on the topic by several American and British 
researchers-G. C. Lemercier-Quelquege, A. Benningsen, G. E. von Grunebaum, and G. 
C. Trimmingham, all of whom have written on various Sufi movements in the Caucasus 
and the USSR. 
It is necessary to caveat this research with the following important explanation. 
The author finds it impossible to characterize here the entire complicated world of Sufi 
teachings, the intricacies of various currents and theological interpretations, or to explain 
the phenomenon of "Sheikdoms" in Chechnya. For that purpose, a different author should 
be sought, and most likely such material would be geared towards a different audience. I 
would dare to generalize by saying that nearly all contemporary researchers are educated 
in the spirit of rationalistic knowledge; the religious cognition has its own world, its own 
values, its own universe. In order to understand it, one needs to accept the dogma of 
miracles, admit that the laws of nature are subject to change. We limit our goals to 
describing the course of events from the outside perspective of this movement, and not 
from the inside. 
Therefore, according to our data, Kunta was born by the end of the first third of 
the 19th century,187 in the family of a Chechen named Kisha from the village Melchi-Khi 
(Istee-Sou). Kisha's family belonged to the clan of Gukhoy, one of the 120 Chechen 
clans. This comparably small family drew its roots from the Andic society of Daghestan, 
as well as from the eastern part of Chechnya and Ichkeria. According to data from 
informative sources, when the then future Sheik turned 7, his parents moved to a 
relatively small village of Eliskhan-Yurt on the river Michik, which subsequently gave 
name to the entire Chechen society (Michigonic). 
The story goes that even prior to the birth of the future saint, various unusual 
phenomena took place, which were keenly observed by his mother Khedi. And indeed, 
186 "Ustaz" - religious teacher 
187 By the time he was captured in 1864, Kunta-Hadji was 35-40 years old. 
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si.nce ~~rly ch~ldhood the, bo~ attracted ~ttent!~n due to his extraordinary natural wisdom, 
11ls ability to lead people s mmds, and hiS ability to see into the future. At the same time 
he .wa~ unable to receive a rigorous religious education, although there are source~ 
i.ndlcatmg .that he c?uld recite the ~ntire .Koran by age 12. Establishing a family, the 
future ~helk was p~'lmanly engaged III agncultural work and raising bees. His wife was, 
accordmg to certall1 sources, the daughter of a famous Chechen warlord-Baibullat 
Taimiev ("the terror of Caucasus" in the words of the renowned RussiaIl t 
I k· . .. poe A.S.Pus 1 m, who apparently was acqualllted With hun), who reportedly died in the earl 
1830's. Thi~ fact sl~ggest~ th~ ~mportance of the "Son of Kisha" in the society, despite hi~ 
povert~. HIS phYSical dlsablhty, along with his keen mind, deep religious zeal, and 
except~onal ~Ift of prophecy drew him to the teachings of Sufism, which had already 
been circulatlllg throughout the North Caucasus for some centuries. It is known he first 
learned of Sufism sometime during the fourth decade of the 19th century from a fam 
I 'b d Sh 'k ., ous Na 11 . f~8 . el Tashu-I-IadJI of the N.aqshband religious current. Tashu-I-Iadji, just like 
Shamll }lIInself: had been. an ~,pprentlce of Mohammed Yara, a popular preacher of the 
so-ca.lled Caucastan Mundlsm, whtch demanded of its followers to approach God not 
only III prayer, but also on the battlefield as warriors against the "non-faithful". It is quite 
probable that Kunta had met other Naqshband Sheiks from Chechnya such as Umal t-
Hadji and Ghezn-Hadji, especially in the period of the Caucasus warI89.' a 
In the .meantime, the ~all!gasus war, w!lich ~ad begun yet in 1817, was close to an 
end. The Imamate of Shamtl was showlllg signs of weakness, after 25 years f 
resistance against Russia, a great world power at the time. 191 This weakness had to do n~t 
only with external cir~umstances. The problem also stemmed from the fact that the 
Imamate govern~nent Its.elf. h.ad become a burden for the mountaineers, who were 
unac~ustom~d Wlt~ the dlsclphne of law; permanent military incursions, high taxes, and 
ever II1creaslllg dulles had exhausted the population. Despair and opposition were starting 
to gain momentum in the Imamate. 
Under the~e extreme.c!rcumstances, the "Son of Kisha," approaching the age of 
30, spoke out against the pohcles conducted by Shamil, calling on his followers to refrain 
from getting involved in wO.rldly issues and focus solely on prayer while seeking the 
mercy ~f God. ~e also predicted the fall of the Imamate and the imprisonment of the 
Imam hnnse!f. HIS sta~ements, ~acked by the young preacher's increasing authority, were 
warmly received by thiS mountall1ous nation racked with fatigue and hopelessness. 
. .. Imam Sha~il, a p~rson ~f great patience and scrupulous fairness, responded by 
II1Vltll1g .the asc~tIc. to .hls ca~lt~1 Ved.eno several times, where ~e was given the 
~PPOltUI1lt~ to "dlsp~lte hts convl.ctlons with the . Imam's theologians. 19" Legends say the 
~on of Klsha easl.l~ baffled !l1S opponents With the depth of his queries. Finally, by 
edrly 1859, at Shamll s suggestIOn, the refractory Chechen departed on his pilgrimage to 
18, Imam Shamil (1797-1871) - religious and secular leader of imamate; considered to be a legendary hero 
?i9 the Chechens and some other ethnic groups in the Caucasus. 
9 The Caucasus War (1817-1864) resulted in the conquest of Caucasus by Russia. 
I I) Imamate -theocratic in its ideology and feudal in its political and social structure, this state existed in 
the North-Eastern Call~asus. Shamil created an Imamate in the territory of Chechnya and Daghestan in the 
!9~40s for struggle agal11st Russia. Disintegrated in 1859. 
19' More detail in the journal "Vainakh Scgodnya," N-2(4) 1997. 
- Sham~l didn't support Kunta-Khadji because he wanted 10 preserve muridism; he disliked the popularit 
of Kunta s followers and their calls for asceticism and equality. y 
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Mecca (hadji).193 On August 26, 1859, surrounded by the Russian army on the Gunib-
Dag Mountain, Shamil capitulated and was sent as war prisoner to Russia l94. 
One of the fundamental characteristics of the "Hadji" fraternity, which sets it apart 
from the other Sufi brotherhoods of the Northern Caucasus, is the so-called "quick" or 
"loud" zikr195 and a peculiar ritualistic dance. This raises the question as to when and 
where did "Hadji" become acquainted with such details of the Qadirian current of Sufism, 
namely the "loud" zikr (scream of prayer, or typical Islamic call to prayer by a loud crier 
(muezzin) located atop the minaret - the tower of the Mosque). Was it prior to his 
pilgrimage to Mecca, or during the travels? Not even the murids can agree on this issue. 
One way or the other, during his three-year journey throughout the Ottoman 
Empire, the "Son of Kisha" had the opportunity to encounter various Sufi currents and 
interpretations, but it is clear that he had chosen to concentrate of the Qadirian one. l% It 
is true that the pre-Revolutionary author G.A. Vertepov believed the father of the 
Chechen eikhrism was a follower of the Roufai'a movement (named after its founder 
Sayed Ahmed Roufai'a), which used fire in its worship, inflicting wounds using cold 
weapons, and so forth. However, the practice of eikhrism in Chechnya does not confirm 
the presence of such extremes. 
The "Son of Kisha" had been in the Ottoman Empire between the years 1859 and 
1861, yet his correspondence was arriving in Chechnya even before 1861. In his epistles, 
he preached prayer "zikr-ullah," love for one's neighbor, the need for earning one's bread 
with one's own work, helping the poor and the orphans, the importance of abstaining 
from alcohol and tobacco, forgiving one's enemies, including those who had committed 
mortal offenses, and so forth. 
Upon his return from Mecca in 1861, his rating and popularity rose considerably 
among the Chechen people. He was now a "Hadji", a preacher, a prophet, whose 
prophecies concerning the fate of the Imamate and Shamil had fully come true. At that 
time, numerous adepts soon surrounded him, forming a religious community with a rather 
strong internal organization. Soon thereafter, the "Son of Kisha" became a "Sheik", which 
in Chechen terms implies holiness. He was recognized as a man, to whom the future and 
the mysteries of the Universe had been revealed, and as a symbol of that, he observed the 
"khalvat"-a voluntary time of fasting and prayer which could last for many days-
which he spent in a deep underground cave (still preserved by his worshipers in the 
village of Eliskhan-Yurt). 
The brotherhood was headed by the "holy teacher" himself, who was also known 
as "the leading Imam". Two most trustworthy disciples, Salman and Machik, were given 
the right to conduct religious services, the so-called preaching of the Qadiri tarikat; they 
were also named as Sheiks. For the ongoing administration of the fraternal Order, nahibs, 
vekhils, turkhs, and tamads (supervisors) were named from among the most prominent 
disciples. 
The "Son of Kisha" and his representatives were demanding that ordinary murids 
follow the holy rituals of the zikr, strictly abide by the Shari'a (Islamic Law), dedicate 
themselves to serving God alone, and not participate in worldly affairs. The movement 
193 This opinion is not support by the documents. 
194 More detailed in the journal "Vainakh Segodnya," no. 2(4), 1997. 
195 This custom was prohibited in imamate. 
196 Abd ai-Qadir al-Gilani (1077-1166), who lived in Iraq, is the founder of this school of thought. In the 
middle of the 12th century he was well known in Baghdad and the Islamic world. 
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quickly spread throughout the entire Chechen territory and even into nei(Yhborin Ingushe~ia, the s?un.d of ~i~r was heard in evelY corner of the country. At the sa~e tim;' 
along wlth the flse ~n rellglO.us consci~nce based on the Order of "Hadji," a strong anti-
governmental conspIracy aga1l1st Impenal Russia emerged in Chechnya. 
I~l order to gain a ~eep und~rsta~ding of the causes that fueled this conspiracy, we 
need qUIckly to charactenze the SituatIon created after Russia defeated the Imamate in 
Chechnya. 
. 'The country had. be.en comp~ete~y ra:aged by the long-lasting war; the population 
111 Chechnya at the beg1l1111ng of thIS hIstOrIcal period was close to 200,000 inhabitants 
an.d. after o~ly 25 ye.ars, in the .186~'s, it numbered about 130,000. Losses from direc~ 
111llltary actIOns, famll1e, and epIdemICS amounted to at least 150-200 thousand VI'Ct' 
I . Ims. T le massive and complicated irrigation system of the Chechen plateau had been 
destroyed. The strong opponent had captured all forests and half of the arable land. 
. The unbearable econom~c, physical and moral climate of constant pressure 
~xpenenced by the Chechen natIOn demanded resolution. The military catastrophe and 
fall. of the Imamate represented ?nly a short pause in the ongoing saga of the warrior 
nation. Already, by May 1860, 111 Eastern Chechnya (Ikcheria) and in the heights of 
Argun, a new arme~ peasant revolt had burst out under the leadership of former nahibs, 
supporters of Shamll. By late January 1860, Czarist generals destroyed 15 auls (villa ) 
. II I . . . ges 
111 (C lena to suppress the rebellion 111 Eastern Chechnyal97 . Nahib Bysangur Benoyevski 
had been captured, and hanged upon conviction by a military-field trial. 
During the summer o~ 1861, the entire Argun okrug (region) had been captured by 
:he rebels und~r the leadershIp of Ouma Douev and Ata'i Ataev. By the fall of 1861, 15 
ll1fantry battalions, 700. ~oss~cks, 1,900 units of cavalry, 3 artillery divisions had 
conduc~ed a re:enge miSSIon 111 the mountains of Chechnya. In December 1861, the 
Argun ll1SUlTectlOn had been crushed, and the leaders captured and exiled to Russia. 
. Having been defeated in open. insur:e~tions, the patriotic forces of Chechnya 
deCIded to take advantage of the grow1l1g religIOUS movement of the Son of Kisha and 
car~y out an nationali~t uprising .with ~he aim of overthrowing the foreign, authorit~rian 
regIme of the conquenng power, nnpenal Russia. 
n is important to mention that we are operating here with the notion of the 
"Kl~nta-H~ldji m?vem~~t". ~ith a certain degree of understanding. The Sheik personally 
del:l~d be1l1g a tItular sptrltual leader" or Imam and, moreover, had ceased his personal 
actIvity as a preacher, communicating with his people through mediators. He used to 
characterize hi~nself ,:s "tl:e Messiah sent unto the world by the Imam (Makhdi)" to 
prep~r~ the believers ~o.r his. return. In the meantime, the movement had been gradually 
acqumng a more political focu~ a~d had attracted numerous supporters from among 
vet~rans of the late Imam. Shamll" 111 essence all who were unhappy about the current 
pollt.y .. By .1863 an espeCially secret leadership had developed to challenge the czarist 
admll11Stratlon. There were lesser leaders, nahibs, higher murids, essentially an entire 
hierarchy of power had been established. 
197 General.Ennolov, supr~me commander in the Caucasus region in 1817-1827, developed a plan for the 
conquest 01 Caucasus, whIch wa~ to be Implemented first in Chechnya; it included Ihe construction of 
fortresses, destructIOn of rebel villages and elimination of their inhabitants. After Ermolov was r II d' 
1827, the policy of 'elimination' continued. More detailed in the journal "Vainakh Segodnya~;' ~~~2(;-~~ 
1998: Avtorkhanov A. "Caucasus, the war of Caucasus, and Shamil." ' 
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Imperial forces, which by that time had already acquired significant experience 
fighting the liberation movements of Caucasian nations, were able to introduce their 
agents and informants within the zikrist movement. Having known of the upcoming 
conspiracy, the Czarist ranks were opposing the more orthodox mullahs and Chechen 
clergy, giving bribes to influential persons in Chechen villages, and there was even a split 
among the masses based on theological divergences. 
On the other hand, the Czarist authorities stationed their troops in the key 
locations of the Chechen plain and mountains, and strengthened their garrisons. Without 
warning, on January 3, 1864, in the Shalin portion of the Argun region, the Russians 
captured the "Son of Kisha" and his brother Movsar. In no time, a special convoy 
transported the captives across the mountain first to Vladikavkaz, and then to the city of 
Novocherkassk. Suspecting that their "spiritual leader" was under arrest in the fortress of 
Shali, several thousands of fanatically oriented murids gathered there, led by Salam and 
Machik, the closest supporters of the Saint from Eliskhan-Yurt. Holding a black flag, the 
famous Chechen cavalier Vara was also in attendance. 
By the second half of the month of January, the murids gathered there had already 
sent three delegations to the prince Tumanov, commander of the Czarist regiment in the 
Shalin fortress, demanding the release of the "Son of Kisha," and were thrice denied. 
Then a frantic ZIKR started; believing in Allah's intervention anel the divine powers of 
their missing spiritual leader, the immense crowd of about 3,000, including women, 
dropped their guns and pistols, approaching the soldiers with revenge and determination. 
The Russians responded with fire, and murids were forced to pick up their daggers and 
swords, and engage in a furious attack against the Czarist soldiers. 
Under heavy artillery fire, the murids could not resist, and were crushed quickly, 
over 200 were killed, and several times more were wounded. This battle of January 18, 
1864 remained in the memory of the Chechen people as "Sha'altan Tom" - "the dagger 
fight of Shali.,,198 
After this bloody battle, 18 of the key leaders of the murids were captured as 
prisoners, and sent to hard labor camps with sentences from 5 to 8 years. Tens of active 
murids were exiled. Zikr and other ritual customs were outlawed under the penalty of 
exile, in the mosques in all villages anti-zikrist preaching was read. 
However, the person mostly responsible for these events, who became a victim of 
the nationwide anti-governmental conspiracy, the person who has always preached 
abstinence from worldly affairs and who opposed violence as means to fight evil, 
preacher and ascetic, was exiled for life in the city of Ustyuzhko in the Novgorod 
gubernia (province). He passed away there on May 19, 1867, and there is evidence 
indicating the Sheik died of complete exhaustion caused by famine. 
In fact, zikrist believers consider that the Sheik never died, but only passed to a 
"hidden", invisible state or "condition". This clearly explains the Messianic mood, which 
still persists among the zikrist community. 
The Imperial authorities in the Caucasus were hoping that the massive defeat and 
execution of murids in the battle of Shali would end this new religious-political 
movement. But this turned out to be a self-delusion, the movement went underground, 
and the masses continued to revolt from time to time. Thus in May of 1865, a villager 
from Kharacha, Taza Ekmirzaev, proclaimed himself as the spiritual follower of the 
198 More detailed in the journal "Vainakh Segodnya," no. 1-3(7-9),1998: Said Akhmed Isaev "Massacre in 
Shali." 
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imprisoned saint, ~nd two more villages joined him in rebellion. Gathering 200-300 
supporters ~nd holdmg a green flag, Taza ~k.mirzaev adv.anced at the head of his group to 
the mountall1 of ~hetash~KO\t (where traditionally reulllons and national meetings were 
held) and proclallned hnnself Imam. In turn, the Czarist commandant immediatel 
de~loyed troops for the occupation of the strategic points in Northern Chechnya. Befor~ 
their approach to the Taza camp, the local village elite, who probably regained their sens 
of political self-survival, crushed the movement. e 
Taza was captured, and sentenced to execution, but later the sentence was 
replaced by 12 years of hard labor, and subsequent life exile in Sibetia. The Khara h 
village was fined, and villagers from Elistandji were even forced to relocate due t~ t~ .~ 
disobedience. elt 
. For se:eral years following the above events, a powerful and energetic wan'ior 
Vlra operated II1 ~hechnya. He started as a local warlord, but soon after the battle of Shali 
was IU1n:ed Nahl? of the Order. ?f "the Son of Kisha". He attempted to revive the 
commul1lty, and hiS efforts and mlhtary feats during the partisan war that followed ear d 
I · I' f . ne 11m t le Image 0 a natIOnal hero. A set of popular songs and ballads about him circulate 
throughout Chechnya. However, the death of Vara in a battle against a Czarist 
detachment ended all hopes of re-establishing the political importance of the Order. 
. C,~nv~nce.d that "the Che~hen t~'ibe" among all nationalities in the Terskaya oblast' 
(regIOn) malI1tatn~d the potentl~l spirit of a mass resistance," the Imperial authorities 
adopted a system~ttc, planned eXile of the Chechen mountaineers towards the frontier of 
the Ot.toman Empire. 01: the other hand, the mountaineers themselves began to emigrate 
as a. sign of protest agamst the oppressive regime that deprived them of their freedom. 
Dunng th~ summer ?f 1865, 5,000 families, about 23,000 people, left Chechnya. This 
was a ul1liu~ n~~slve exodus f:om Rl~ssia by the most energetic, freedom-loving 
segment 0 t le. . echen. populatl?l1. Thl.s was clearly an ethnic catastrophe for the 
Chechens, depnvlI1g the future nation of ItS best sons. (A similar catastrophe of ev 
I 'bl . , en more lOrn e proportIOns, took place in 1944, when the Stalinist regime exiled the entire 
Chechen nation to Siberia, condemning it to extinction. An identical catastrophe is taking 
place in Chechnya today, in the eyes of the whole world.) 
Only due to thei~ ~lI1believable sense of hard work and unique ability to survive 
under tl~e. ha~'shest condition has th~ .Chechen nation managed to escape disintegration 
and anl1lhllatlon. Mor~over, the traditional economy and customs of the Chechen people 
soon .w~re :estored, Villages sprang back to life from ruins, houses, mosques, schools, a 
new Irngatlon system arose. Chechnya soon regained its fame as "the granary" of the 
Northern Caucasus. 
, . In the 9
1h 
decade of the 191h cent~lry,. zikrism started to spread again in Chechnya 
dn:1 d~OI~g !ngushets as well, but thiS tnne only as a religious teaching. Certain 
ratlonaltstlC I.deas s~arted ~o develop, and the system of organization of religious 
brotherhoods In the Villages Improved. 
. H~wever, the single gravitati~nal center in the person of the living sage had 
ahead~ disappeared .. ~t the same time, especially during this period, new Sheiks 
belonglI1g to the Qadlrtst movement sprang up. Many called themselves "receivers" of 
the. Shei~ !rOl~ Eliskhan-Yurta. However, they were applying changes in the rituals, 
whl~h dlstll1gUlshed them from the classical Kunta-I-Iadjist movement. Overall such 
Sh~lks as Bam.at-Girey, Chin-Mirza, and Batal-Hadji exercised and continue to exe;'cise a 
regIOnal and Village-type presence, while the l11uridic brotherhood of the "Son of Kisha" 
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embraces the entire country. Later, already in the 1950's, under the Soviet regime, a new 
Order developed of the so-called Vis-Hadji - "the white hats." Those consider themselves 
followers of Kunta-Hadji, but are denied categorically by his true followers. 
It is worth mentioning that by the early 20lh century Daghestani printing houses 
had published volumes of the aphorisms of the late Chechen saint, collected by his 
followers. For someone to be a follower of the "Son of Kisha" means at this stage to 
essentially accept him as "a spiritual father" (teacher)-one's representative before God. 
This acceptance implies to carry out a certain number of additional prayers or formulas, 
such as the interpreting of the "zikr" in the form of a loud cry with a shrill voice (with a 
rhythmical repetition of the fundamental Islamic prayer "la-i1aha-il-Allah" while in an 
ecstatic state running around in a circle performing a peculiar "dance"). At the same time, 
the murid agrees to embrace a set of rigid moral and ethical rules. The Order worships as 
holy places the tomb of his mother Khedi in the village Hadji-aul in the Veden region of 
Chechnya, as well as the remains of Sheik's courtyard in the village of Eliskhan-Yurt. We 
have to mention that the Order has no unified center, each village brotherhood is led by 
an elected Turkh (leader). Zikrism was first popular among the poorest layers of Chechen society. This is 
why zikrists tended to support the Bolshevik banners during the 1918-20 civil war in 
Russia, often fighting against the armies of General Denikin. The Soviet power initially 
flirted with the Chechen Muslims to gain support, but soon placed believers under 
repression. Arrests of zikrist became commonplace, however, as sources point out, the 
zikr never ceased, not even in prisons or exile. 
After the mass deportation of 1944, the Kunta-Hadji brotherhood gained even 
more strength. Its growing popularity could be explained by the great misfortune of the 
Chechen people: people often found hope and peace in their systematic prayers to God 
and the invocation of their spiritual father, the "Son of Kisha." 
Upon the restoration of the Chechen-Ingushet Republic in 1957 and until the 
beginning of Perestroika in 1985, the relations between authorities and Kunta-Hadjists 
have been largely antagonistic, sometimes shifting to alert-neutrality. The process of 
revival of Islamic values has led to the intensification of Kunta-Hadjist communities, the 
establishment of a religious hierarchy and growth of the number of those studying 
Islamic theology. In the fall of 1991, a group led by General 1. Dudaev acceded to power in 
Chechnya. It is said to have represented the radical extreme of the nationalist circles
l99
. 
Declaring himself as a murid of Kunta-Hadji, Dudaev ensured his new regime a certain 
level of political support from the more backward and darker side of this movement. The 
symbols of the "new revolution" were zikrist mass prayers on the central streets and 
squares of Grozny. However, praying on the dirty city asphalt for true murids was a 
disgrace, and so it is clear that these popular "dances" were engineered by a hired 
"ensemble" of individuals with no dignity and respect for the true traditions. The Kunta-
Hadjist communities soon overcame the euphoria of "victory", and their attitude towards 
Dudaev and the like became more careful. In the years of the first Chechen war (1994-
96), young murids actively protested against the violence of the federal Russian troops, 
and displayed fanatical resistance. 
199 There arc different opinions among the Chechens about the role of Dudaev in the events of 1991-1995. 
Some still consider him a national hero. 
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In the aftermath of the war the entire Ch h . 
danger-Vakhabism. On the edge of this new fi ht ec en s~~lety was struck by a new 
whose values were declared heretical by the Vgkh wb~re.partlcUlarIy the Kunta-Hadjists, 
a T a Its 111 the first I I· . 
bloody clashes occurred in villages between . p ac~. n a senes of 
declared that the Vakhabits should be k· kYo dung mUfrIdS and Vakhablts. The zikrists IC e out a Chechnya a d 
supported by all other Sufi orders in Chechn a TI· r . ' n wer~ strongly 
the Mufti (leading cleric) of Chechnya, Ahm~d~H ~.~ ;~ was perslste~tly carned out by 
the "Son of Kisha." a JI a yrov, belongll1g to the Order of 
In July 1998 in the city of Gudermes massive fi ht 
and their opponents which led to the kl·ll· f gl s arose between the Vakhabits 
. . '. mg 0 over 00 Vakhabits H . I .. 
maJOl battle, the Vakhablts concentrated tl .. f· . aVll1g ost thIS 
. .. len orces m the to f U· M 
transform1l1g It 1I1to their fortress. wn 0 IUS- artan, 
The Kunta-Hadjists, on the other hand 0 enl su· . 
Shari'a Islamic laws, have severely criticized 're~de~ A pp~rtll1g the rest~ratlOn .of the 
stand towards the issue of Vakhabism. For th:r m tt ... ~askh~dov for hIS ambIguous 
Kunta-Hadjists have adopted a neutl.al p .t. a el, 111 t le CUlrent war many ordinary 
, OSI lOn, or even a c1ea r M kl d 
such as A.H. Khadyrov Their hope is th t tl R. ,r an 1- as 1£1 ov stance, 
. . , a le USSIans will O! d I· b 
Vakhablts want to strengthen their positions in Ch h f 1e ay eave, ut the 
TI 
.. ec nya orever. 
le Kunta-HadJlst Order in Chechnya to this da . .. 
there are no direct descendants of the Sheik. It is onl y has no ul1lt~d leadership,. smce 
descendant of the Sheik's daughter Genel .. ll D G hY kfnown that ll1 Turkey reSIdes a 
, ,. yunes orrner he d f· th . . 
the Turkish armies, and in Russia dwells add '. a 0 e JOll1t-staff of 
. ,. , escen ant of the Sheik' . 
major I. Suleymenov. There are rumol·s tIl t d d s slster-General-
. a escen ants of Sheik' b· tl M . 
1I1 Iraq .. The emergence or a unifying leader could make th . s 10 ler, ovsar, l~ve 
power 111 Chechnya. The emergence of a stron I d. e Older the strongest rulmg 
potentially lift that individual to one of ' the g ea I~g 'p~rsonality in the Order could 
country. most slgl11flcant levels of power in the 
Paradoxically, to become leader of the Kunta-Had·· .. 
subsequently in a position to seize political power ther JIst Ordel III Cl~echnya, and 
someone like General D. Gyupesh, because he is the led: WOldlld be pOSSible only for Hadji.
2oo 
' , on y Irect escendant of the Kunta-
Relevance of Religious Brotherhoods to Current C fl· t 
In ·d t . h on IC 01 er 0 apprecIate t e relevance of the Kunta H d·· . . 
to place this brotherhood within the context of other h a JI I~o:eme~t, It IS necessary 
noted above the Kunta HadJ·i I·S onl f suc. aSSOCiatIons III Chechnya. As 
, , y one 0 an estImated t 
?rotherhoods but, with the Vakhab movement (also know' ,,:enty-seven Cheche~ 
IS one of the two largest. A result of this multiplicity of n ;s .the DJama~t m~vement), It 
has developed an exclusive sense of . re Iglous group1l1gs IS that each 
, commul11ty or c1ann· I h 
members to promote only their immedl·ate "b th "N IS mess t at encourages 
b 
. ' ro ers. on-memb .. d 
elllg beyond the moral code that applies onl with. e~s me legar ed as 
Consequently, corruption is not only rampant but i~ al .Ill r~~c~ partlcula~ community. 
affiliation and dogma. " so JUS I Ie on the basts of religious 
200 None of the descendants of Kunta-Hadji can become the I 
mamtained a religious life and their style of living is far f theader of the movement since none of them has rom e prinCiples advocated by Kunta. 
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One important consequence of this corruption has . been .. an ex~cerbati?l~ of 
tensions leading to violent clashes involving g.roups I.dentlfled with .religl~:lS 
brotherhoods. An example of one such clash occurred 111 1998 Il1 Guder~es, an 1I1dustllal 
center which had fallen under the control of organized crime after the fIrSt Chechen. war. 
In this case an armed Vahkab group known as Shariat's Guar~ wage? a battle ~gall1st a 
criminal gang that was attempting to assert control over local mdustnal enterpns~s. The 
criminal gang was under the leadership .of Sulim Yamadaev, o~e of Chechny~.s m~st 
prominent underworld figures, and enjoyed t1~e patronage of :,-hmed .. Kadnov, an 
important local politician. An estimated twen:y-e!ght people were killed dUl1l1g the battle 
and an additional dozen died in subsequent skmTIlshes. 
Thus, both corruption and violence have become th.e hallmark .of contemporary. 
Chechen life. The deterioration of national life is reflected m changes .111 the patterns of 
societal violence since the immediate post-Soviet period. Dunng the first Chechen ~ar, 
I d f natl'onal unity that was reflected in the fact that almost all factiOns t lere was a egree 0 ' . . . joined in fighting against the Russians. For them, the flghtmg was seen ~s a war of 
'national liberation. The more recent post-Soviet years ha:e b~en charactenzed by the 
vendettas undertaken by individuals whose families wel:e killed m early clashes that now 
appear to have been futile efforts to assert natio.n~l identity. . ' . 
In this environment, it is not surpnsmg that almost all sects have. aimed 
formations, generally described as militias, which w~rk to advan~e the. ofte~-dlv~rgent 
interests of their particular brotherhoods. A very practical cxplanatlon fO! the appearance 
f h f'ormations is that the North Caucasus region is populated by numerous veterans o suc , fl' . Abkh' d 
I rved not only in the Soviet Anny but fought in the con ICtS Il1 • aZIa an w 10 se . '1' d . d h 
Afghanistan. These people have li~ited trail~in~ beyo!ld their ml I~ary e .~lcatiOn an av.e 
almost no civilian career options 111 the regiOn s ternble econ.O!TIlc envlIonment. Shamll 
Basaev, for example, participated in the fighting in Abkhazl~ and Maskhadov served 
with Soviet troops that suppressed demonstrations in the BaltiC state~. For such people, 
armed conflict provides a natural opportunity for one of the services they can best 
provide. . . h f . \ .. The basis for most active of the armed groupS III Chechnya IS t ~ ol.mer mem JelS, 
of the Shariat's Guards, the Shariat's "Courts", and former members ot various o~'gans of 
state security. The Shariat's Guards and the Shariat's Courts were orgamzed by 
Chechnya's Vakhab movement and were composed of young mel~ who saw themselves 
as being at the forefront of the fight against criminality and corruptIon., T~e stated"goal of 
the Shariat's Guard was to implement decisions made by .the Shanat s C.ourts .. Th.o.s~ 
quasi-judicial decisions were intended to ser:e as ex~resslons of the. Shana, ,W!lICh I~ a 
specific interpretation of the Koran. The S.hana, th~refore, s~ould be vlewe~ as. law ba~ed 
on the Koran. Each sect, of course, has Its own 1l1terpretatlon of th~ ~0r.1l1 m ordel to 
advance that sect's specific agenda. The overall goal of the Shanat s ?uard was to 
reinstate the "true law", which for the Vakhab movement means full equality for a~1 men 
before God and the law. In short, this was intended to be a practical code of behaViOr for 
all followers of Islam. . '. . 
Since 1997, most of the militias' military efforts have been directed agamst othel 
sects rather than against state agencies. This situation is, il~ .large part, a result of the 
Shariat's Guard view of itself as the true expression of legltnnate state power and th.e 
resultant necessity to direct their efforts against other sects that challenged their 
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legitimacy. In this, they present themselves as being involved in the struggle against 
corruption and criminality rather than as agents of religious extremism. 
The religious brotherhoods have emerged as major political actors in Chechnya 
and they played an important role in facilitating the demise of the Dudaev regime. While 
Dudaev utilized religious appeals in advancing his political agenda, it became obvious to 
serious Muslims that Dudaev's commitment to the Kunta Hadji movement was, at best, 
superficial and, more likely, insincere. This apparent hypocrisy, coupled with complaints 
over his increasingly dictatorial operational style and suspicions that he was a "Russian 
agent," contributed to his political decline. 
Contrast between Kunta Hadji and Vakhab Movements 
While the clashes between the various armed formations might be dismissed as 
the expressions of narrow self-interest, it is essential to note that there are important 
differences between the Kunta Hadji and Vakhab movements as well as other sects 
operating in Chechnya. 
Much of the contrast between the two main groups is based on theology and 
philosophy. There are several important religious differences that set the Kunta Hadji 
movement apart from the Vakhab movement. The latter believes in general equality 
before the law and argues that all men should be treated equally regardless of nationality, 
wealth or language. Like most Muslims, this egalitarianism does not extend to gender 
issues. Women have a subordinate place in Chechen society, whether they live in the 
Vakhab or the Kunta Hadji communities. The Vakhab brotherhood is far less clannish 
than the Kunta Hadji and, for that matter, other sects. The Kunta Hadji, of course, unlike 
the egalitarian Vakhab, claim numerous saints. 
Again consistent with Vakhab egalitarianism, leadership positions or functions are 
not inherited. They are, by contrast with the Kunta Hadji, based on personal merit. This is 
closer to traditional Chechen mentality. Their struggle against corruption is justified on 
the basis of their view that there should be no favoritism or special arrangements for 
anyone. In the Kunta Hadji community, leadership is inherited and closely parallels their 
belief in sainthood. 
In addition to these religious disputes, there are important distinctions in terms of 
their respective views of Russians. The position of the Kunta Hadji, while not identical to 
that of the "official" Islamic institutions of the Soviet era, is much more supportive of 
Russia. Its essentially pacifist posture creates an environment in which it is possible to 
advocate a continued place for Chechnya within the Russian Federation. By contrast, the 
Vakhab movement advocates the restoration of "true Islam" and supports a struggle 
against domination by the Russians. They are also openly hostile to the region's 
traditional Sufi Islam because of its moderation and its incorporation of pre-Muslim 
traditions. For the many Russians as welJ as Sufi Muslims who feel threatened by this 
tendency, Vakhab is simply another word for "extremist." The Kunta Hadji followers 
joined the Russians in denouncing the Vakhab movement as a great threat to Chechnya. 
Interestingly, while there is considerable focus on the anti-Russian orientation of the 
Vakhab, it is important to remember that the brotherhood maintains an equally critical 
view of Western society. 
It is also essential to note that there is a fundamental trend that works against 
stability in the North Caucasus region. It is something that can be seen not only in 
Chechnya but also in Dagestan and central Asia. The main features of this trend are: (I) a 
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collapse of state authority, (2) a lack of faith in state officials, (3) economic adversity, 
and (4) persistent intervention by Islamic groups from abroad. The violence that came in 
1999 to Dagestan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikstan was driven by these factors and 
the Chechen situation is subject to the same factors. 
Connections with Taliban and Other Outside Groups 
Recognition of the fact that such an important and dynamic brotherhood can, like 
other Islamic movements for national liberation, pose a challenge to Western society 
prompts legitimate questions about their relationship with Islamic organizations outside 
the region. While Islam did much to provide spiritual comfort to Chechen soldiers during 
the 1994-96 war, it has undergone dramatic changes during the decade since the collapse 
of the USSR. Most important, open borders have made it possible for Arab missionaries 
espousing a more radical form of Islam to find convelts in the Caucasus region as well as 
what was Soviet central Asia. The newly converted Muslims have been increasingly 
hostile to Chechnya's traditional Sufi orders and have opened the door to outside groups 
with more violent tendencies. 
One such organization that has attracted attention because of these developments 
is the Taliban movement. While there are important philosophical differences between 
Chechen religious brotherhoods and the Taliban there are also some similarities. The 
essential fact, however, is that within Chechnya there is little interest in the Taliban or, 
for that matter, other such groups located abroad. The primary reason for this disinterest 
is the fundamental provincialism of most Chechen movements. They see events and 
actors within Chechnya and the Chechen community as of primary importance and all 
others of limited relevance to their struggles. 
Apparently, the Russians take the Taliban much more seriously. Reportedly, 
Russian President Vladimir Putin feels Osama bin Laden and the Taliban have supported 
Chechen efforts to gain their independence from the Russian Republic and has even 
threatened to bomb Afghanistan if necessary. 
Chapter Seven 
ISLAM IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS: A PEOPLE DIVIDED 
